I now read it. Almost as good as the title! Brilliant unpause.
Something that came to mind is that, at least here in Sweden, it's not uncommon for someone who's gone through a crisis to say that they wouldn't want to be without that crisis, because it's part of who they are now.
Can a good case for be made in doe actualism? I kinda view possible worlds and counterfactuals as very useful fictions. But I haven't thought that much about this stuff.
What counts as being the same person is, in the end, up to convention, as I see it. We're neither genetically nor memetically accustomed to cloning and teleportation. If we were, people's opinions (and philosophers are people) would probably be quite different.
Thanks, interesting. “Identity” means so many things it’s hard to sort them all out. Sometimes numerical identity, sometimes self-conception, and I’m tempted to think crisis/trauma contributes only to the latter.
Loved this post. Here's a somewhat related thought experiment failure that I came across. About a decade ago I was part of a team conducting a national longitudinal study of American youth. We were interviewing young adults in their mid-to-late 20s then. When we asked them if they had any regrets about their lives, they seemed pretty unanimous in saying no -- the basic idea was that regretting anything meant "I wouldn't be the person I am today." They seemed to think that every action of theirs was somehow necessary for constituting their present self, which therefore rendered regret impossible. They stretched "everything happens for a reason" to include their own actions. Perhaps a theme to explore in a different post?
Thanks! Some friends read my post and we had the same discussion. One said he doesn’t regret anything that was necessary to lead to the birth of his child, and yet can also agree he shouldn’t have (eg) gotten wasted that one time. I think there’s no real inconsistency here — how to do counterfactual thinking is purpose sensitive.
I have “identical” twin sons (1 fertilized egg). But they are not identical because they are mirror image identical—one is left handed and one is right handed. Although they are similar in many ways, at age 55 they are also quite different. Moreover, if there had been one more division of the fertilized egg before separating into 2 embryos, they would be “Siamese” (conjoined)twins. So unique identity is simply because they were conceived at a particular moment by their mother and me.
To be a bit, well, pedantic about this, I don't think the Lewisian picture will provide sufficient resources to your cousin. The worlds in the Lewisian multiverse in which there are sufficiently similar counterparts to your cousin and her mother will either have very different histories than the actual world or have very different laws. (Those are the only ways to avoid the Kripkean ramification of minute differences throughout the history of a world.) In either case, those worlds will be too weird---you can't make projections about that world's future and can't make inferences about your own situation---to make that thought experiment be of any use.
If she simply wants to compare herself to someone else who has had a similar life trajectory but with slightly different parameters, then sure, the Lewisian multiverse will be amenable (indeed, so might be the actual world). But I doubt your cousin will recognize that person as her counterpart. And I somehow suspect that seeing *herself* in a different situation is quite key to the emotional valence and corresponding intuitions pumped in this thought experiment.
This is a safe space for pedants! Lots to be said, but I don’t think possible worlds need to be fully fleshed out, nor that any implied weirdness would block the purposes my cousin (etc.) has for such thought experiments
But if I imagine myself just as I am and just as I've always been but for the particular sperm and egg from which I germinated, then I am imagining me and not my counterpart. If two situations differ in only one respect, then they don't differ at all.
I now read it. Almost as good as the title! Brilliant unpause.
Something that came to mind is that, at least here in Sweden, it's not uncommon for someone who's gone through a crisis to say that they wouldn't want to be without that crisis, because it's part of who they are now.
Can a good case for be made in doe actualism? I kinda view possible worlds and counterfactuals as very useful fictions. But I haven't thought that much about this stuff.
What counts as being the same person is, in the end, up to convention, as I see it. We're neither genetically nor memetically accustomed to cloning and teleportation. If we were, people's opinions (and philosophers are people) would probably be quite different.
Thanks, interesting. “Identity” means so many things it’s hard to sort them all out. Sometimes numerical identity, sometimes self-conception, and I’m tempted to think crisis/trauma contributes only to the latter.
Loved this post. Here's a somewhat related thought experiment failure that I came across. About a decade ago I was part of a team conducting a national longitudinal study of American youth. We were interviewing young adults in their mid-to-late 20s then. When we asked them if they had any regrets about their lives, they seemed pretty unanimous in saying no -- the basic idea was that regretting anything meant "I wouldn't be the person I am today." They seemed to think that every action of theirs was somehow necessary for constituting their present self, which therefore rendered regret impossible. They stretched "everything happens for a reason" to include their own actions. Perhaps a theme to explore in a different post?
Thanks! Some friends read my post and we had the same discussion. One said he doesn’t regret anything that was necessary to lead to the birth of his child, and yet can also agree he shouldn’t have (eg) gotten wasted that one time. I think there’s no real inconsistency here — how to do counterfactual thinking is purpose sensitive.
I have “identical” twin sons (1 fertilized egg). But they are not identical because they are mirror image identical—one is left handed and one is right handed. Although they are similar in many ways, at age 55 they are also quite different. Moreover, if there had been one more division of the fertilized egg before separating into 2 embryos, they would be “Siamese” (conjoined)twins. So unique identity is simply because they were conceived at a particular moment by their mother and me.
Funny that kripke doesn’t explicitly address identical twins. I guess he thinks genetic essence is necessary but not sufficient for identity.
I’m very glad you remembered to unpause at the end because if you hadn’t I would’ve been stuck there forever
To be a bit, well, pedantic about this, I don't think the Lewisian picture will provide sufficient resources to your cousin. The worlds in the Lewisian multiverse in which there are sufficiently similar counterparts to your cousin and her mother will either have very different histories than the actual world or have very different laws. (Those are the only ways to avoid the Kripkean ramification of minute differences throughout the history of a world.) In either case, those worlds will be too weird---you can't make projections about that world's future and can't make inferences about your own situation---to make that thought experiment be of any use.
If she simply wants to compare herself to someone else who has had a similar life trajectory but with slightly different parameters, then sure, the Lewisian multiverse will be amenable (indeed, so might be the actual world). But I doubt your cousin will recognize that person as her counterpart. And I somehow suspect that seeing *herself* in a different situation is quite key to the emotional valence and corresponding intuitions pumped in this thought experiment.
This is a safe space for pedants! Lots to be said, but I don’t think possible worlds need to be fully fleshed out, nor that any implied weirdness would block the purposes my cousin (etc.) has for such thought experiments
Must like and comment just because of the brilliant title. Will probably read post later.
But if I imagine myself just as I am and just as I've always been but for the particular sperm and egg from which I germinated, then I am imagining me and not my counterpart. If two situations differ in only one respect, then they don't differ at all.